In response to queries asked to a statistical database, the query system should avoid releasing summary statistics that could lead to the disclosure of confidential individual data. Attacks to the security of a statistical database may be direct or indirect and, in order to repel them, the query system should audit queries by controlling the amount of information released by their responses. This paper focuses on sum-queries with a response variable of nonnegative real type and proposes a compact representation of answered sum-queries, called an information model in "normal form," which allows the query system to decide whether the value of a new sum-query can or cannot be safely answered. If it cannot, then the query system will issue the range of feasible values of the new sum-query consistent with previously answered sum-queries. Both the management of the information model and the answering procedure require solving linear-programming problems and, since standard linear-programming algorithms are not polynomially bounded (despite their good performances in practice), effective procedures that make a parsimonious use of them are stated for the general case. Moreover, in the special case that the information model is "graphical." It is shown that the answering procedure can be implemented in polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
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• F. M. Malvestuto et al. functions, such as sum, average, max and min) for groups of employees, which, at the conceptual level, are specified by predicates involving the attributes GENDER, AGE, and DEPARTMENT, but not NAME and SSN, which are private attributes. In this paper, we focus on queries such as
Q:
select sum(SALARY) from Personnel where GENDER = M which we call sum-queries. 1 In the previous example, the attribute SALARY is called the response variable of the sum-query Q and the "where"-clause specifies the category of interest. Given an instance D of the SDB containing the relation R of name Personnel, the category specified by the "where"-clause of Q determines a subset of R, called the query-set of Q, and the sum of the values of the attribute SALARY over the query-set of Q is the value of Qon D. If SALARY is a confidential attribute, then answering Q (and, more in general, answering a statistical query whose response variable is a confidential attribute) raises concerns on the compromise of individual privacy, since releasing the value of Q could lead to the ("exact" or "approximate") disclosure of the value of SALARY for some element of the query-set of Q [Cox 1980; Cox and Zayatz 1995; de Waal 1996, 2000] . Such a sum-query, which risks the confidentiality of the response variable and, hence, the security of the SDB, is called intrusive and the category S specified by its "where"-clause is said to be sensitive in D. Typically, for a fixed positive integer k, S is sensitive if the number of tuples in R that fall in S are less than k (exact disclosure) or there are k or fewer tuples in R that give a dominant contribution to the value of Q (approximate disclosure) [Cox 1980, Cox and Zayatz 1995; de Waal 1996, 2000] .
The confidentiality of a response variable σ can be attacked either (in a directed way) by an intrusive sum-query or (in an indirect way) by a nonintrusive sum-query whose value on D, combined with the responses to previouslyanswered sum-queries on D, leads to an accurate estimate of the total of σ for some category that is sensitive in D. In the latter case, we call the sum-query tricky.
In order to make an SDB secure, when a new instance D is created, for each confidential attribute σ the sensitive categories in D are identified and each of them is assigned a fixed nonnegative number, called its protection level de Waal 1996, 2000] . Such a category S will be considered protected at a certain time if its protection level comes out to be less than the width of the interval, called the feasibility range de Waal 1996, 2000] , of the feasible values for the total of σ for S that are permitted by the responses to previously answered sum-queries. In our proposal, if the 1 Note that a sum-query containing the "group-by" clause such as select AGE, sum(SALARY) from Personnel where GENDER = M group by AGE is equivalent to a set of our sum-queries. current sum-query Q is recognized to be intrusive or tricky, then the query system of the SDB will give a noninformative response to Q by issuing the feasibility range for Q, determined by the responses to all previously answered sum-queries with response variable σ . Now, it is easy to decide whether Q is or is not intrusive, since it is sufficient to check the presence of the category specified by Q in the list of the categories that are sensitive in D for σ ; but, deciding whether Q is or is not tricky requires "auditing" [Chin 1986; Chin and Ozsoyoglu 1982; Malvestuto and Mezzini 2001, 2003; Malvestuto and Moscarini 1999] the previously answered sum-queries on D with response variable σ and, for each sensitive category S, comparing the protection level assigned to S with the width of the feasibility range for the total of σ for S, determined by the value of Q and by the responses to the previously answered sum-queries on σ . If each sensitive category is protected, then we say that Q can be safely answered and the value of Q will be issued. A special case occurs when Q is evaluable from previously answered sum-queries, that is, when the value of Q is uniquely determined by them; then, Q is neither intrusive nor tricky and it can be safely answered.
The scenario we are considering can be depicted as a competitive game played by the query system, which has as its opponent a hypothetical statistical user, henceforth, referred to as the (data) snooper, who (with no prior information) attempts to pry an accurate estimate of the total of a response variable σ for some sensitive category out of the responses to all answered sum-queries on D with response variable σ . This assumption is not unrealistic if the query system of an SDB (also in order to lighten its workload) allows every user to look into the archive of answered sum-queries on D.
In most previous work [Adam and Wortmann 1989; Chin 1986; Chin and Ozsoyoglu 1982; Malvestuto and Mezzini 2001, 2003; Malvestuto and Moscarini 1999] , the technique of auditing was applied under the assumption that the snooper also knows the query-set of each answered sum-query. Thus, for each answered sum-query the snooper can write down an equation, whose unknowns represent the unknown values of the response variable for the tuples in its query-set. As a consequence, the size of the snooper's model comes out to be proportional to the size of the instance D of the SDB, which may contain a very large number of tuples [Adam and Wortmann 1989] . On the other hand, the hypothesis that the snooper knows the query-sets of answered sum-queries is not realistic. In order to make the snooper's model independent of the size of the instance of the SDB, some authors [Chang-Chen and McNamee 1989a,b; Chin 1986, Malvestuto and Moscarini 2002] have suggested working with categories instead of query-sets. Accordingly, in order to model the information conveyed by a set of answered sum-queries, we shall introduce an equation system whose unknowns correspond to the classes of a suitable partition of the union of the categories specified by the answered sum-queries. Thus, typically (i.e., with a very large database) the size of our equation system comes out to be far less than the size of the equation system based on query-sets.
To repel the attacks of the snooper, the query system will make use of its own information model, which essentially is the same as the snooper's model and will be constructed incrementally as the value of a new-sum query is issued. Such an information model may suffer from certain drawbacks (e.g., redundancy [Chang-Chen and McNamee 1989a,b; Chin 1986, Malvestuto and Mezzini 2004] ) and we will give a procedure for getting a "compact" representation of the information model, we call a normal form, that the drawbacks are missing from. Finally, using a normal form of the current information model, we shall address the question whether or not a new sum-query can be safely answered.
Answering this question raises some computational problems (recognizing evaluable sum-queries, updating the information model, and computing a feasibility range), whose solutions depend on the data type of the response variable. If it is of real type, then standard algebraic methods can be used to solve all of them efficiently; moreover, if sum-queries contain all the "group-by" clause, that is, if they are table queries (or "cuboids" [Wang et al. 2002 [Wang et al. , 2004 ), then there also exist cardinality-based conditions that are sufficient for them to be inference free [Wang et al. 2002 [Wang et al. , 2004 Zhang et al. 2004] . If it is of nonnegative type, then we can resort to linear-programming or integer linear-programming methods, depending on the specific data type. In general, the case that the response variable is of nonnegative-integer type is extraordinarily difficult from a computational viewpoint and a general theory has yet to be developed [Duncan et al. 2001] .
In this paper, we only consider the case that the response variable is of nonnegative real type. Then, a natural approach consists in resorting to standard linear-programming algorithms (e.g., the simplex method [Chvátal 1983; Schrijver 1985] ). Unfortunately, none of them is polynomial even if they are polynomial, on the average, and have good performances in practice [Chvátal 1983; Schrijver 1986 ]; on the other hand, existing polynomial linear-programming algorithms (e.g., the ellipsoid method [Chvátal 1983; Schrijver 1986] ) have bad performances in practice. Therefore, in order to solve the computational problems raised by the security of the SDB, it is convenient to make a parsimonious use of standard linear-programming algorithms and "there is considerable interest in finding alternative techniques" [Duncan et al. 2001] . Accordingly, we will present a cubic evaluability test based on standard algebraic methods, and show that, in the case that the current information model is "graphical," the problem of finding a feasibility range can also be solved efficiently.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing basic definitions in Section 2, in Section 3 we present the semantic part and the equation system of the model used by the snooper to capture the information conveyed by the responses to answered sum-queries. Section 4 contains the query system's answering procedure, we propose to avoid the disclosure of sensitive categories. Section 5 introduces the normal form of a model, which not only provides a compact representation of the information conveyed by the responses to answered sum-queries, but also allows the testing of evaluability in cubic time without resorting to linear-programming methods. Section 6 deals with the updating of the query system's model when a new sum-query is answered. In Section 7 it is shown that in a graphical model our answering procedure can be implemented efficiently using network algorithms. Finally, Section 8 contains some closing notes and possible directions for future research.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
Suppose we are given an instance D of an SDB, which contains a relation R. In this section we consider sum-queries whose response variable, say σ , belongs to the schema of R. Let a be an attribute in the schema of R that is used by such a sum-query. Typically, if the domain of a is large, then the "where" clause of the sum-query will contain recoded values in such a way that the size of the recoded domain of a is made small de Waal 1996, 2000] . For example, the recoding of the attribute AGE may consist of year classes instead of numbers of years, or the recoding of a geographic attribute with a hierarchical structure (e.g., country, state, county) may consist in "chopping off " some digits of its values of precision de Waal 1996, 2000] . To avoid confusion, the attributes in R present in the "where" clause of a sum-query will be referred to as categorical variables de Waal 1996, 2000 ] to take into account that their domains may have been recoded. For example, it is likely that the schema of a relation R reporting labor data must contain the four attributes GENDER, AGE, CONDITION, and SECTOR; then, we may assume that the domains of the categorical variables GENDER, AGE, CONDITION, and SECTOR be {M, F}, {young, middle, old}, {employed, unemployed}, and {Agriculture, Industry, Services}, respectively. By V σ we denote the set of all categorical variables corresponding to the attributes in the schema of R that can occur in the "where" clauses of sumqueries with response variable σ . We assume that the values of each categorical variable in V σ are mutually exclusive, but we do not assume that its values are globally exhaustive. Thus, the values of SECTOR are mutually exclusive but not are globally exhaustive, because they do not apply to unemployed people. If the values of a categorical variable are not globally exhaustive, we simply add a null value to its domain. Finally, let c be a tuple on V σ where c(a) may be null for some a ∈ V σ ; the tuple c can or cannot be meaningful. 
are both maximal. The maximal meaningful tuples on V σ will be referred to as cells and their set is denoted by dom(V σ ); moreover, subsets of dom(V σ ) will be referred to as categories.
Let K be a category. By the statistic of σ over K we mean the collection (i.e., the multiset) of the values of σ over the (possibly empty) set of tuples in R that fall into the category K , and by the total of σ for K we mean the sum of the data in the statistic of σ over K . In order to speed up the evaluation of sum-queries with response variable σ , the query system will make use of a materialized aggregate view on σ , which will be referred to as the summary table on σ ; it is created initially and reports the total of σ for each cell c. As we said, a user can ask for the total of a statistic of σ by submitting a sum-query Q, where the selection criterion is specified be an arbitrary (consistent) condition P on a (possibly empty) subset of the set V σ of categorical variables built up with logical connectives. Because of the assumptions of mutual exclusiveness and global exhaustiveness of cells, P uniquely determines a category K , we call the target of Q, such that P is logically equivalent [Malvestuto and Moscarini 1990 ] to the formula
The value q of Q can then be computed by the query system from the summary table on σ (without accessing the database relation R) simply as the total of σ for K . Example 1. Consider an instance of an SDB containing a relation of name Personnel with schema {NAME, GENDER, AGE, SALARY}. Here, SALARY is assumed to be an attribute of nonnegative real type. A sum-query with response variable SALARY will take its categorical variables from the set V SALARY = {GENDER, AGE}. We assume that the domains of GENDER and AGE are {M, F} and {young, middle, old}, respectively, and that the summary table on SALARY contains the following data:
Consider the following four sum-queries with response variable SALARY:
from Personnel where (GENDER = M and AGE = young) or (GENDER = F and AGE = middle)
from Personnel where (GENDER = M and AGE = middle) or (GENDER = F and AGE = young)
from Personnel where GENDER = F and AGE = middle.
Their targets are the following relations with schema {GENDER, AGE}:
Using the summary table on SALARY, the query system is able to compute the values
of Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , and Q 4 without accessing the relation of name Personnel.
In the next section, we shall see how the snooper can use the information released by the query system in response to sum-queries to get a more-orless detailed information on the total of σ for a (possibly sensitive) category of interest.
THE SNOOPER'S MODEL
Let Q 1 , . . . , Q n be answered sum-queries whose response variable σ is of nonnegative real type. The amount of information conveyed by the answers to Q 1 , . . . , Q n will be defined in such a way to capture all the snooper's knowledge about them (that is, their targets and their values). The snooper's information model consists of a set of variables, each of which is interpreted as the total of σ for a certain category, and of a system of linear constraints.
Let K i and q i , i = 1, . . . , n, be the target and the value of Q i , respectively. By ⊆ dom(V σ ) we denote the set of cells contained in the categories
. . , C m } be a partition of such that each K i is the union of some of the C j 's. Using the following notation
one has that
so that the snooper's information model can be described by the system of n linear equations
we re-write in matrix form as
Here, each variable x j stands for a feasible value of the total of σ for C j and, hence, is subject to the nonnegativity constraint: x j ≥ 0. Since the size of system (1) depends on the number of classes of the partition C, it is convenient to choose C with the minimum number of classes. It is well-known [e.g., see, Maier 1983, pp. 132-133] that such a partition of is uniquely determined and is formed by grouping together the cells in that are contained in exactly the same sets in K (see Figure 1 ). According to the terminology used in [Maier 1983 ], this partition of will be referred to as the minimal disjoint-set basis of K (the basis of K, for short).
Remark 1. A category K i is itself a member of the basis of K if, and only if, for each
To sum up, the information model has a semantic component, given by C, and an analytical component, given by system (1).
Example 1 (Continued). Consider again the four sum-queries Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 . Then = dom({AGE, GENDER}) and the basis C of K is formed by the following six elementary categories (i.e., singletons):
The targets of Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 can be written as
and system (1) reads
x 4 + x 6 = 6.5
(1.1)
Of course, system (1) has at least one nonnegative solution. Suppose now that the snooper is interested in the total of σ for a (possibly sensitive) category K of interest. He can obtain the tightest lower bound and the tightest upper bound on the total σ for K as follows. Let (see Figure 2 )
The tightest lower bound, denoted by lower(K ), is set to zero if J = Ø; otherwise, it is taken to be
The tightest upper bound, denoted by upper(K ), is set to +∞, if K is not contained in ; otherwise, it is taken to be
is called the feasibility range of the total for K . If lower(K ) = upper(K ), then the total for K is said to be evaluable in the information model.
Example 1 (Continued). The general solution of system (1.1) is
By the nonnegativity constraints, the couple (x 2 , x 3 ) is any point of the region shown in Figure 3 .
Thus, if the snooper is interested in the total of SALARY for the category
then, after computing the minimum and the maximum of the function x 5 +x 6 using a standard linear-programming method, he can find that the feasibility range for the total of SALARY for K is [0,19.5].
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HOW TO BEAT THE SNOOPER
To repel the attacks of the snooper to the confidentiality of the response variable, the query system will make use of its own information model, which will be constructed incrementally as the value of a new-sum query is issued. Suppose that, after a certain number of answered sum-queries, every sensitive category is protected in the query system's model and a new sum-query Q is submitted. We call the query system's model the prior model. As said in the Introduction, if Q is intrusive or tricky, then Q should be answered by issuing the feasibility range of its value given by the prior model; otherwise, the value of Q should be issued. Since recognizing intrusive sum-queries is a matter of routine, the most demanding task that the query system is called to carry out is how to decide whether or not Q is tricky. Of course, if Q is evaluable in the prior model, then Q is not tricky. Let us assume that Q is not evaluable. The query system should add to the prior model the piece of information conveyed by the value of Q, and in the "augmented" information model, we call the posterior model, it should then check that each sensitive category is still protected. If this is the case, then (and only then) Q is not tricky. We now present a procedure for constructing the posterior model from the prior model given the target K and the value q of Q. Let system (1) be the equation system of the prior model, and let C = {C 1 , . . . , C m } be the basis in use, that is, the partition of that gives the interpretation of the variables x 1 , . . . , x m of system (1). Let
= ∪ K and let C be the partition of defined as follows (see Figure 4) :
Without loss of generality, henceforth, we assume that J = Ø and = . The posterior model consists of m + p + 1 nonnegative variables x 1 , . . . , x m , . . . , x m+ p+1 , which correspond to the categories in C = {C 1 , . . . , C m , . . . , C m+ p+1 }. The equation system of the posterior model is obtained from system (1) by replacing each occurrence of x j h by x j h + x m+h , and by adding the 
both of which have been assigned the protection level 3.0. Assume that the four sum-queries Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 of Example 1 are submitted in this order. We now show that each of them can be safely answered. The following are the four information models resulting from answering the sum-queries Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 , respectively, and the feasibility ranges for the sensitive categories. Note that answering Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 could risk S 1 only, but answering Q 4 could risk S 2 as well. 
x 4 + x 6 = 6.5 
x 4 + x 6 = 6.5 x 5 + x 6 = 1.5
with the same meaning of the variables as in the prior model. The general solution of system (1.2) is (x 1 = 15, x 2 = 9, x 3 , x 4 = 14 − x 3 , x 5 = 9 − x 3 , x 6 = −7.5 + x 3 )
By the nonnegativity constraints, x 3 is any number in the interval [7.5, 9] . Note that the sensitive category S 1 is exactly the category associated with x 1 and, since the value of x 1 is uniquely determined, S 1 would not be protected if the value of Q 5 were released. Therefore, Q 5 is tricky and, in response to Q 5 , the query system will issue the feasibility range [0, 19.5] for K 5 given by the prior model (see Example 1).
To summarize, a procedure for answering a sum-query Q with target K and value q should work as follows:
1. If K is sensitive, then the answer to Q will be the feasibility range of the total for K in the prior model. 2. If the total for K is evaluable in the prior model, then the answer to Q will be q. 3. If neither K is sensitive nor the total for K is evaluable in the prior model, then the posterior model will be constructed, and for each sensitive category S contained in = ∪ K , the feasibility range of the total for S in the posterior model will be computed and compared with the protection level associated with S so that, if S is not protected, then the answer to Q will be the feasibility range of the total for K in the prior model. 4. If each sensitive category S contained in is protected in the posterior model, then the answer to Q will be q, and the posterior model will serve as the prior model for processing the next sum-query.
From a computational point of view, tasks (1), (2) and (3) require computing the feasibility range of the total for K and for each sensitive category contained in . Of course, a feasibility range can be found using standard linearprogramming methods (e.g., the simplex method [Chvátal 1983; Schrijver 1986] ). Unfortunately, as recalled in the Introduction, standard linearprogramming methods are not polynomial algorithms, even if they are polynomial, on the average, and have good performances in practice. Thus, a parsimonious use of linear-programming methods is recommended [Duncan et al. 2001] .
We shall prove that, if a compact representation of the prior model is used, we call a "normal form" (see the next section), then the evaluability of the total for K -task (2)-can be tested in cubic time using standard algebraic methods so that the query system need not to resort to linear-programming methods for computing the feasibility range of the total for K . Moreover, the cubic algebraic algorithm can also be used to reduce the computational cost of carrying out task (3) if a compact representation of the posterior model is also used: before computing the feasibility range of the total for S in the posterior model, S is tested for evaluability and, if the total of S comes out to be evaluable (this was the case for S 1 in Example 2), then its feasibility range need not be computed, since the query system can soon conclude that S is not protected. Accordingly, we propose the following answering procedure (Chart 1).
In the next section, we shall introduce the normal form of an information model and present a cubic test for evaluability.
A POLYNOMIAL TEST FOR EVALUABILITY
The cost of the storage representation of an information model such as system (1) depends on the size of its equation system, by which we mean the sum of the numbers of occurrence of its variables, that is, i=1,...,n |J i |. For example, a storage representation of the information model may be the hypergraph of which the coefficient matrix A of system (1) is the (node-hyperedge) incidence matrix, where the ith node is "weighted" by q i and the j th hyperedge is "labeled" by C j . In this section, we provide a method for reducing the size of system (1) • F. M. Malvestuto et al.
Step and, hence, the storage cost of the information model. We first give a procedure for reducing the size of system (1), while preserving the number of its variables and, then, a procedure for reducing the number of its variables. Preliminarily, we state some useful definitions.
Let X be the set of nonnegative solutions of equation system (1). A variable x j is determined over X, if x j = x j for every x and x in X, and an equation in system (1) is redundant if the set of nonnegative solutions of the equation system obtained from system (1) by deleting that equation coincides with X. Of course, the presence of determined variables and redundant equations increases the size of equation system (1) surreptitiously. For example, if K i * = C j * for some i * and j * (see Remark 1), then the variable x j * is determined over X and its value equals the value q i * of Q i * so that, if x j * occurs more than once in system (1), then x j * can be replaced by q i * in each equation of system (1) other than the equation x j * = q i * . Moreover, if K i = K i for i = i , then the ith equation is redundant and can be deleted.
We say that an equation system is irreducible if r each determined variable x j occurs in exactly one equation, which is of the form x j = c j (where c j is the value of x j ), and r no equation is redundant, and that an equation system with variables x 1 , . . . , x m , say
is a reduced form of system (1) if r A is a 0-1 matrix, r system (2) is irreducible, and r the set of nonnegative solutions of system (2) coincides with X. Sometimes, the size of system (2) can be further reduced as follows. Let us consider its determined variables whose values are zero. They will be referred to as null variables. Let {x j : j ∈ Z } be the set of null variables of system (2). If Z = Ø, then system (2) contains the set of equations
which, by the nonnegativity constraints, is equivalent to the single equation
Let us introduce a new variable x 0 , which stands for the sum j ∈Z x j , and is to be interpreted as the total for the category C 0 = ∪ j ∈Z C j . We can then replace the equations x j = 0, j ∈ Z , in system (2) by the single equation x 0 = 0 so that the resulting equation system has |Z | − 1 variables less and |Z | − 1 equations less. Let {x j : j ∈ L} be the set of nonnull determined variables, and {x j : j ∈ H} the set of undetermined variables. If Z = Ø and L = Ø, then, the resulting equation system is like
System (3) with the interpretation of its variables given by the following partition of
defines what we call a normal form of the information model. Given system (3) and a category K , the feasibility range of the total for K can be obtained as follows (see Figure 5) . Let
Since the total of the response variable for the category C 0 ∩ K is definitely zero, the tightest lower bound for K is equal to
and, if K is contained in , then the tightest upper bound for K is equal to 
and each x j , j ∈ J ∩ H would be a null variable (contradiction). Thus, condition (b) must hold. As to condition (c), suppose by contradiction that
The following contradiction would then arise whose computation requires solving two linear-programming problems. However, we can do better since we do not need to resort to linear-programming methods, but can use a merely algebraic method, which rests on a technical lemma (see Lemma 3 below) involving an arbitrary linear equation system whose variables are constrained to be nonnegative real-valued.
AFFINE FORM OF FARKAS'S LEMMA (e.g., see Schrijver 1986, page 93) . Let H x ≤ b be a system of n linear inequalities with m unknowns such that the set X of its solutions is not empty. Suppose that the linear inequality j =1,...,m u j x j ≤ d holds for each x in X. If c is the maximum value of the linear function j =1,...,m u j x j over X, then there exist n real nonnegative numbers y 1 , . . . , y n , such that
The following is a direct consequence of Farkas's Lemma.
LEMMA 1 (MALVESTUTO 1993) . Let A x = q be a system of n linear equations with m unknowns, such that the set X of its nonnegative solutions is not empty. If c is the maximum value of the linear function j =1,...,m u j x j over X, then there exist n real numbers λ 1 , . . . , λ n , and m nonnegative real numbers v 1 , . . . , v m such that 
Then, for every x in X, one has that
By the nonnegativity constraints, each term v j x j = 0 for all j , which implies that it is not the case that for some j there exists x in X for which v j = 0 and x j = 0. PROOF. Let X be the set of nonnegative solutions A x = q. Of course, the function j =1,...,m u j x j is constant over X if, and only if, the function j / ∈Z u j x j is constant over X . By parts (i) and (iii) of Lemma 2, the function j / ∈Z u j x j is constant over X if, and only if, there exist n real numbers λ 1 , . . . , λ n , and, for each j / ∈ Z , there exists a nonnegative real number v j such that
Since the equation system A x = q contains no null variables, one has that each v j is zero so that the function j / ∈Z u j x j is constant over X if, and only if, there exist n real numbers λ 1 , . . . , λ n such that
Finally, for every x in X, one has that
The following are two straightforward consequences of Lemma 3. We now turn to the problem of testing condition (c) of Theorem 1. Since the equation system G x H = w has no null variables, by Lemma 3 the function j ∈J ∩H x j is constant if, and only if, the characteristic vector u of J ∩ H, that is, the vector u with
is a linear combination of rows of G. If r is the number of rows of the matrix G, then we have to check the consistency of an equation system with r unknowns, Example 3. Consider an instance of an SDB containing a relation of name Personnel with schema {NAME, GENDER, AGE, DEPT, SALARY}, where SALARY is assumed to be of nonnegative real type. Let {A, B, C, D, . . . } be the domain of DEPT. The basis of {K 1 , . . . , K 14 } is formed by the following fifteen elementary categories:
x 4 = 0, x 6 = 5, x 8 = 10, x 9 = 10, x 12 = 10, x 13 = 15, x 14 = 20, x 15 = 10
x 5 + x 6 + x 7 + x 8 = 25 x 9 + x 10 + x 11 + x 12 = 25
x 2 + x 6 + x 10 + x 14 = 60
Using standard linear-programming methods, we find that each variable x j is determined:
x 6 = 5 x 7 = 5 x 8 = 10 x 9 = 10 x 10 = 5 x 11 = 0 x 12 = 10 x 13 = 15 x 14 = 20 x 15 = 10 The set of these fifteen equalities is the reduced form of system (1.2) and its normal form is x 0 = 0 x 2 = 30 x 5 = 5 x 6 = 5 x 7 = 5 x 8 = 10 x 9 = 10 x 10 = 5 x 12 = 10 x 13 = 15 x 14 = 20 x 15 = 10 where x 0 stands for the total of SALARY for the category
It follows that the total for a category K is evaluable if, and only if, K -C 0 is the union of zero or more categories from {C 2 , C 5 , C 6 , C 7 , C 8 , C 9 , C 10 , C 12 , C 13 , C 14 , C 15 }.
MANAGEMENT OF THE NORMAL FORM
In our Answering Procedure of Section 4, at Step 3, when the posterior model is constructed, it should be reduced in normal form because it becomes the next prior model if Step 5 is executed. This also allows to test the evaluability of each sensitive category (Step 4) in cubic time. In this section, we present a procedure for getting the posterior model in normal form (Step 3). We start with the prior model, which is assumed to be in normal form and to consist of system (3) with the interpretation of its variables given by the partition C = {C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C m } of where the categories C 1 , . . . , C m are partitioned into the two groups {C j : j ∈ L} and {C j : j ∈ H} as shown in Figure 5 . Let
The procedure first constructs the semantic part of the posterior model using the partition C = {C 0 , C 1 , . . . , C m , . . . , C m+ p+1 } of = ∪ K defined as follows (see Figure 7) :
Without loss of generality, again we assume that J = Ø and = . For h = 1, . . . , p, associate with the variable x j h the category C j h from C , and introduce the variable x m+h and associate with x m+h the category C m+h from C . Next, introduce the variable x m+ p+1 and associate with x m+ p+1 the category C m+ p+1 from C . The equation system of the posterior model is then obtained from system (3) as follows. Rewrite system (3) as
For h = 1, . . . , p, replace each occurrence of the variable x j h by the expression x j h + x m+h . Finally, since the total for the category C 0 ∩ K is always zero, add the equation
which we rewrite as
where q = q − j ∈J ∩L c j . Thus, the equation system of the posterior model reads
At this point, in order to get a normal form of the posterior model, we need a reduced form of system (6), that is, to find its determined variables and its redundant equations. Preliminarily, note that x 0 is a null variable of system (6) and that each x j , j ∈ L − J , is a nonnull determined variable of system (6). Moreover, for each j h ∈ J ∩ L, the variables x j h and x m+h appear only in the equation x j h + x m+h = c j h and are undetermined, since the feasibility range for both is [0, c j h ]. Let us consider the remaining variables and their equation system
Finding a determined variable or a redundant equation in system (7) can be done using linear-programming methods. We can do better by exploiting Corollaries 1 and 2. Thus, if we first find the set of null variables of system (7) using a standard linear-programming algorithm, then we can decide in cubic time if a nonnull variable in equation system (7) is determined or if an equation in equation system (7) is redundant. Indeed, the search for null variables can be restricted to the variables corresponding to categories for which the summary table gives a zero total; analogously, the search for nonnull determined variables can be restricted to the variables corresponding to categories for which the summary table gives a nonzero total. Suppose that we have already found a reduced form of system (7), say
Finally, we are in a position to get a normal form of the posterior model. Its equation system is obtained by combining system (6) and system (8):
where the variable x 0 has now associated the category
Example 2 (continued). Consider, again, the posterior model constructed when the sum-query Q 5 is processed.
Since C 6 is the only category for which the summary table on SALARY gives a zero total, the only candidate for a null variable is the variable x 6 . Using the simplex method, we find that the maximum value of x 6 is 1.5 so that x 6 is not a null variable. At this point, the nonnull determined variables are found by exploiting Corollary 1. The variables that are candidates for nonnull determined variables are x 1 , . . . , x 5 and one finds that the only determined variables are x 1 and x 2 with values 15 and 9, respectively. For example, the characteristic vector with coefficients equal to 1/2 for the odd rows and −1/2 for the even rows. Thus, x 1 is determined with value (24 − 18 + 29 − 6.5 + 1.5)/2. After deleting the two determined variables and adding the two equations x 1 = 15 and x 2 = 9, we obtain the following equation system
x 5 + x 6 = 1.5
At this point, the redundant equations are found by exploiting Corollary 2. If the equation x 3 + x 5 = 9 is first examined, then it comes out to be redundant and none of the remaining equations is redundant. Explicitly, for the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation x 3 + x 5 = 9, one has x 3 + x 5 = (x 3 + x 4 ) − (x 4 + x 6 ) + (x 5 + x 6 ) 9 = (14) − (6.5) + (1.5) Thus, we have obtained the following reduced form of the equation system of the posterior model:
Since there are no null variables, this is also the equation system of the normal form of the posterior model.
GRAPHICAL MODEL
We saw that, in general, the Answering Procedure given in Section 4 needs to resort to linear-programming methods only to solve the following two problems:
(P1) given the equation system of an arbitrary information model (e.g., the posterior model), find the set of its null variables; (P2) given the equation system of an information model in normal form (e.g., the prior model), find the feasibility range for a given sum of variables.
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However, some special instances of either problem can be very efficiently solved. For example, if the information model represents a "decomposable" set of marginals of an unknown multidimensional table, then the feasibility range for a single variable (corresponding to a cell entry) can be computed using closed formulas [10] . In this section, we show that both problems P1 and P2 can be efficiently solved for a graphical information model, that is, for an information model with equation system G x = w
where the coefficient matrix G can be viewed as the incidence matrix of a graph. Note that this is the case whenever the information model represents the contents of internal and marginal cells of a (possibly incomplete) two-dimensional table (see Example 3 ). In what follows, by G = (V , E) with V = {1, . . . , n} and E = {e 1 , . . . , e m }, we denote the graph of which G is the incidence matrix. Moreover, the edges of G are arranged in such a way that, if, l is the number of loops, then the loops of G are denoted by e m−l +1 , . . . , e m . Finally, without loss of generality, G is assumed to be connected.
Problem (P1). If G is bipartite, then Gusfield [1988] proved that, given a nonnegative solution of system (9), the set of null variables can be found in strongly linear time [Gusfield 1988 ]. Two of the authors [Malvestuto and Mezzini 2002] proved that the same holds for an arbitrary graph. The point is how to get a nonnegative solution of system (9). Of course, the query system can get the true solution from the summary table, which requires O(| |) time. However, a nonnegative solution of system (9) can also be obtained without passing through the summary table. For example, if G is bipartite, then Gusfield [1988] proved that the nonnegative solutions of system (9) naturally correspond to maximum flows on a suitable bipartite flow network N (G, w) so that a nonnegative solution can be obtained in time cubic in the number of nodes of G [Ahuja et al. 1993] . If G is not bipartite, then two of the authors [Malvestuto and Mezzini 2002] proved that in linear time one can construct an equation system H y = v
where H is the incidence matrix of a bipartite graph H with 2n nodes and 2m − l edges and v has v i := v n+i := w i (i = 1, . . . , n), such that: r given a solution y of system (10), then a solution of system (9) can be obtained by setting
we call the solution of system (9) associated with y; r given a solution x of system (9), then a solution of system (10) can be obtained by setting
we call the solution of system (10) associated with x.
Thus, since a nonnegative solution of system (10) can be obtained from the flow network N (H, v) in cubic time, problem (P1) can be solved in O(n 3 ). Problem (P2). It has been solved for a single variable by Gusfield [1988] if G is bipartite and by two of the authors [Malvestuto and Mezzini 2003 ] if G is not bipartite, using a maximum-flow algorithm in both cases. We shall show that, more in general, in a graphical information model, the problem of finding the feasibility range for an arbitrary sum of variables can be solved using a strongly polynomial algorithm.
Suppose that, given a subset J of {1, . . . , m}, one wants to compute the tightest lower bound or the tightest upper bound on the sum of variables j ∈J x j over the set of nonnegative solutions of system (9). They can be obtained by solving the linear-programming problem minimize j =1,...,m c j x j subject to G x = w, x ≥ 0
where each c j is set to the j th component of the characteristic vector of J (for the tightest lower bound) or to its opposite (for the tightest upper bound). Now, if the graph G is bipartite, then problem (11) can be naturally viewed as a bipartite transportation problem [Ahuja et al. 1993] and can be efficiently solved using the network simplex method, which is a strongly polynomial algorithm [Ahuja et al. 1993] . If G is not bipartite, then we can translate problem ( 
It is easily seen that, if x is a nonnegative solutions of problem (11) and y is the nonnegative solution of problem (12) and vice versa. Every optimal solution of problem (11), thus, corresponds to an optimal solution of problem (12), and vice versa, and the minima of problems (11) and (12) do coincide. Before closing this section, it is worth considering the special case that the components of the vector w in system (9) are all nonnegative integers. If G is bipartite then, by the integrality theorem and by the total unimodularity [Ahuja et al. 1993; Chvátal 1983; Schrijver 1986 ] of the incidence matrix of G, problem (11) has an integral optimal solution. If G is not bipartite then, since problem (12) has an integral optimal solution and problem (11) has an optimal solution whose components are either integers or half-integers.
CONCLUSIONS
In order to protect the confidentiality of individual data, the query system of a statistical database should be sure that no confidential piece of information runs the risk of being disclosed in an exact or approximate way from responses to sum-queries. To achieve this, the query system should audit sum-queries and issue noninformative answers to sum-queries that directly or indirectly would lead to the disclosure of confidential data. We proposed a compact representation of the information conveyed by the responses to answered sum-queries, we called an information model in normal form, and proposed an answering procedure, which makes a parsimonious use of standard linear-programming methods. We also showed that, if the information model is graphic, then standard linear-programming methods can be avoided at all and the answering procedure can be implemented in polynomial time using algebraic and network algorithms. This suggests a further security measure, which is a sort of query-overlap restriction [Adam and Wortmann 1989] , which, loosely speaking, refuses releasing the exact value of a sum-query Q if Q is not evaluable from previously answered sum-queries and the target of Q overlaps "too much" with the targets of answered sum-queries. If this is the case, then Q will be answered as being an intrusive sum-query, that is, the response to Q will be the range of its feasible values of Q.
Possible directions of future research are:
r auditing sum-queries with a response variable that is of a general additive type (e.g., an Abelian group [Chang-Chen and McNamee 1989a,b; Malvestuto and Mezzini 2004] ), or of a specific type (e.g., a nonnegative integer type or a binary type [Kleinberg et al. 2000] ); r auditing max-or min-queries, by relaxing some restrictive assumptions, such as the individual values of the response variable are all distinct [Chin 1986] and there is a single tuple falling in every sensitive category [Chin 1986; Kleinberg et al. 2000 ].
Finally, note that auditing count-queries requires solving the same integer linear-programming problems as auditing sum-queries with a response variable of a nonnegative integer type. 
